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Abstract— A large number of analog chaos-based secure
communication systems have been proposed since the early
1990s exploiting the technique of chaos synchronization. A
brief survey of these chaos-based cryptosystems and of related
cryptanalytic results is given. Some recently proposed counter-
measures against known attacks are also introduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, chaos-based cryptography has at-
tracted more and more attention from researchers in many
different areas. It has been found that chaotic systems and
cryptosystems share many similar properties. For instance,
chaotic systems are sensitive to the initial conditions, which
corresponds to the diffusion property of good cryptosystems
(for a comparison of chaos and cryptography, see Table 1
in [1]). Basically, there are two major types of chaos-based
cryptosystems: analog chaos-based secure communication
systems and digital chaos-based ciphers, which are designed
employing completely different principles.
Almost all analog chaos-based secure communication
systems are designed based on the technique for chaos
synchronization, which was first discovered in the 1980s and
then well developed in the 1990s [2]. The establishment of
chaos synchronization between two remote chaotic systems
actually means that some information has successfully been
transmitted from one end to the other. This fact naturally
leads to the foundation of a chaos-based communication
system. Then, by keeping some part of the involved chaotic
systems secret, a third party not knowing the secret key
will not be able to reconstruct the information transmitted.
Thus, a chaos-based secure communication system is created.
Following this basic idea, a large number of analog chaos-
based secure communication systems have been proposed
since the 1990s. Meanwhile, related cryptanalytic work has
also been developed to evaluate performance (mainly the se-
curity) of various analog chaos-based secure communication
systems. Though a number of surveys have been published
to introduce progress in this area, they become relatively
obsolete due to the rapid growth of new research work in
recent years.
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The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey of ana-
log chaos-based secure communications and related cryptan-
alytic work, especially focusing on latest work reported since
the year 2000. This paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we first introduce some preliminary knowledge
about the underlying chaos synchronization technique. Then,
we classify most early chaos-based secure communication
systems into three basic types. Next, different kinds of
cryptanalysis are discussed with some concrete examples.
Finally, we enumerate some new countermeasures that have
been proposed to resist known attacks. A few concluding
remarks are given at the end of the paper to express our
opinion on future trends in this area.
II. CHAOS SYNCHRONIZATION
Just as its name implies, synchronization of chaos denotes
a process in which two (or many) chaotic systems achieve
a common dynamical behavior after a period of transient
period. Here, the common behavior may be a complete co-
incidence of the chaotic trajectories, or just a phase locking.
To achieve synchronization, one or more driving signals
have to be sent from a source to the chaotic systems to be
synchronized. According to the source of the driving signal
and the mode of coupling, there are mainly four types of
driving modes:
• directional (internal) driving: one chaotic system serves
as the source of driving and one or more driving signals
are sent from this systems to the others;
• bidirectional (internal) driving: two chaotic systems are
coupled with each other and are driven by each other
in a mutual way;
• network-like coupling: many (more than two) chaotic
systems are coupled with others in some way to form
a complex dynamic network;
• external driving: one or more external signals drive all
the chaotic systems involved towards a synchronized
behavior.
Owing to the nature of secure communications (which means
secret information transmitted from one end to the other),
directional driving between two chaotic systems is employed
for almost all chaos-based secure communication systems.
Therefore, in this section we focus only on this kind of chaos
synchronization.
For chaos synchronization of two chaotic systems with
directional driving, one of the chaotic systems serves as
the master (or drive) system, and the other is the slave (or
response) system. From the communication point of view,
the master and slave system may also be called sender
and receiver system, respectively. For purpose of chaos
synchronization, one or more driving signals have to be
transmitted from the master system to the slave system as
external force to influence the the slave system’s dynamics.
As a result of the driving force, the slave system may be
able to follow the the master system’s dynamics exactly or
in some other forms, thus leading to different kinds of chaos
synchronization like the following ones that are widely used
in chaos-based secure communications:
• complete synchronization (CS, also called identical syn-
chronization): the simplest form of chaos synchroniza-
tion, corresponding to a complete agreement of the
trajectories of the master and slave systems;
• generalized synchronization (GS): a generalized form
of complete synchronization for which the the slave
system’s trajectory converges to the master’s one in the
sense of a one-to-one mapping f ;
• projective synchronization: a special case of GS with
the one-to-one mapping involved being a simple linear
function f(x) = αx;
• phase synchronization: the slave system matches its
phase with that of the master system, though their
trajectories are not the same;
• lag synchronization: a time-delayed version of complete
synchronization for which the slave system coincides
with the time-delayed dynamics of the master system.
Due to other aspects of generating the driving signal, there
are also some other types of chaos synchronization. One of
them is called impulsive (or sporadic) synchronization, which
means that the driving signal is not transmitted to the slave
system continuously, but in an impulsive manner controlled
by a fixed or time-varying time interval τ .
Another related concept called adaptive synchronization
is a technique that can help the slave system synchronize
with the master system in an adaptive way. This concept is
useful not only for the design of analog chaos-based secure
communications, but also for the cryptanalysis, because the
adaption mechanism often implies that a third-party can also
drive its slave system to the sender and then extract some
secret information transmitted from the sender to the legal
receiver.
III. ANALOG CHAOS-BASED SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Most traditional analog chaos-based secure communica-
tion systems can be classified into three basic types: chaotic
masking, chaotic switching (also called chaotic shift keying
– CSK) and chaotic modulation. Although many new designs
have been proposed in recent years, most of them are actually
modified or generalized implementations of these three basic
schemes. In this section, we focus on the three basic schemes
and give a brief summary of their security. More details about
related cryptanalytic results will be the subject of the next
section.
A. Chaotic Masking
The earliest and simplest form of analog chaos-based se-
cure communication is chaotic masking, in which a plaintext
message signal m(t) is embedded into a carrier signal x(t)
to form a combined driving signal s(t) = x(t)+m(t), where
the addition operation “+” can also be replaced by similar
ones such as multiplication. After chaos synchronization is
established at the receiver side, an estimation of x(t) can
be obtained and, then, subtracted from s(t) to recover the
plaintext signal. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of a










Fig. 1. Basic structure of a typical chaotic masking system.
To avoid the negative influence of the hidden plaintext
signal on chaos synchronization at the receiver side, the
energy of the plaintext message signal m(t) should be
much smaller than that of the driving signal s(t), i.e., much
smaller than the power of x(t). Since the message signal
disturbs the driving signal, chaos synchronization cannot be
achieved exactly and, therefore, the message signal cannot
be recovered exactly. Another obvious feature of the chaotic
masking scheme is that the message signal does not influence
the dynamics of the master system at all.
The security of chaotic masking is questionable against
various attacks, mainly due to the fact that an attacker can
always obtain some information from the driving signal to
construct (at least part of) the dynamics of the master system.
As the power energy of the plaintext message must be much
smaller than that of the driving signal, it seems impossible
to essentially eliminate this security defect without changing
the encryption structure.
B. Chaotic Switching (Chaotic Shift Keying)
This scheme is mainly used to transmit digital signals.
At the sender side, two different chaotic systems are used
for 0-bits and 1-bits of the plaintext message, respectively.
That is, the employed chaotic system is switched from time
to time by the plaintext message. At the receiver side, only
one of the two chaotic systems is needed, and the plaintext
bits are recovered according to whether or not the slave
system can achieve chaos synchronization with the master.
Figure 2 shows how a typical chaotic switching system works
to recover the plaintext message. Note that the two chaotic
systems at the sender side may be either homogeneous or
inhomogeneous. If two homogeneous ones are used, one
chaotic system with adjustable parameters suffices, which
makes the realization of chaotic switching systems more
practical.
To ensure the establishment of chaos synchronization


















Fig. 2. Basic structure of a typical chaotic switching (CSK) system with
⊗ denoting the detector of chaos synchronization.
of each plaintext bit should be long enough. Therefore, the
transmission rate of a chaotic switching system is generally
much slower than that of a chaotic masking system. The main
advantage of chaotic switching is that the plaintext signal
can exactly be recovered as long as the level of the signal-
to-noise ratio is not too low.
It has been known that the above simple chaotic switching
system is not secure against many different kinds of attacks.
To enhance the security, some modified chaotic switching
systems have been proposed in recent years, which will be
discussed later in Sec. V.
C. Chaotic Modulation
Different from chaotic masking and chaotic switching
schemes, in a chaotic modulation scheme the plaintext mes-
sage m(t) is injected into the sender system so that its
dynamics is changed by the plaintext message continuously.
In this case, generally an adaptive controller (which can also
be considered as an extra dynamical system bidirectionally
coupled with the sender system) is added at the slave
system according to some rule such that its output m′(t)
asymptomatically converges to m(t). To follow the master
system’s dynamics, generally the controller’s output (i.e.,
m(t)) should be injected into the slave system in the same
way as in the master. See Fig. 3 for the basic structure of a
typical chaotic modulation system. Note that in some chaotic
modulation systems there may be no feedback of s(t) back











Fig. 3. Basic structure of a typical chaotic modulation system.
There are two different types of chaotic modulation:
(1) parameter modulation, in which the plaintext message
signal m(t) modulates the values of one or more control
parameters; (2) direct modulation, in which m(t) is injected
into one or more variables of the master system without
changing the value of any control parameter. In some chaotic
modulation schemes, the plaintext signal is also embedded
into the driving signal, which can be regarded as a modified
version of chaotic masking (via feedback of the driving
signal and some other necessary modifications).
Compared with chaotic masking schemes, chaotic modu-
lation schemes can exactly recover the plaintext signal (in
an asymptotical manner) if some conditions are satisfied.
Considering that chaotic switching systems can only transmit
digital signals, chaotic modulation also has a better perfor-
mance than chaotic switching. In fact, carefully designed, the
chaotic modulation technique can even be used to transmit
more than one plaintext message signal. One possible way
for this is to modulate n control parameters of the master
system with n plaintext message signals, respectively.
The main disadvantage of chaotic modulation is that
the controller depends on the master and slave systems’
structure, which means that different controllers needs to
be designed for different master systems. Controllers may
not even exist in certain cases for essential defects of the
master/slave chaotic systems.
IV. CRYPTANALYTIC RESULTS
Many chaos-based secure communication systems were
proposed without much security analysis. The security of
these cryptosystems was simply “ensured” by the underlying
chaotic systems’ complexity. From a cryptographer’s point of
view, however, the complexity of chaos does not necessarily
mean that a chaos-based cryptosystem is secure. To evaluate
the security of a cryptosystem, all known cryptanalytic
methods (i.e., attacks) have to be investigated specifically
for the target cryptosystem.
As a basic rule in cryptology, it is always assumed that
all details about the target encryption algorithm are known
to the attacker [3, p. 5]. The secret key should be the only
component unknown to the attacker and used to guarantee
the cryptosystem’s security.
The first step of cryptanalysis is to estimate the size of
the key space, i.e., to see if the complexity of exhaustively
searching all possible keys of a cryptosystem is not crypto-
graphically high. According to the computational power of
today’s computers, a key space of size O(2100) is generally
required.
In the case that the key space is large enough, one needs
to further investigate the security of the cryptosystem against
all known attacks, which include the following four kinds of
attacks (classified according to the resources that an attacker
can access):
• ciphertext-only attack: only the ciphertexts can be ob-
served by the attacker;
• known-plaintext attack: some plaintexts and the corre-
sponding ciphertexts can be observed by the attacker;
• chosen-plaintext attack: some plaintexts can be freely
chosen by the attacker and the corresponding ciphertexts
can be observed;
• chosen-ciphertext attack: some ciphertexts can be freely
chosen by the attacker and the corresponding plaintexts
can be observed.
The chosen-ciphertext attack generally works only when the
attacker has temporary access to a legal decipher (receiver),
which is a mirror version of the chosen-plaintext attack at
the encipher (sender) side.
Since the mid-1990s, a large number of cryptanalytic
results have been reported on chaos-based secure commu-
nications. It has been shown that most traditional schemes
are not sufficiently secure from a cryptographical point of
view. In this section, we classify these cryptanalytic results
into several different categories.
A. Low Sensitivity to Secret Key
The most common (and maybe also the most serious)
problem about chaos-based secure communications is the
low sensitivity to the secret key (i.e., the control parame-
ters of the master chaotic system). The low sensitivity is
a necessary requirement for real implementations of any
analog chaos-based cryptosystem, because it is impossible
to ensure exact matching of the master and slave systems.
Unavoidable noise and manufactural component deviation
involved in chaotic circuits are the two main factors causing
this security problem. According to recent results reported
in [4], [5], it has been verified that most analog chaos-based
secure communication systems suffer from this defect.
As a direct result of this low-sensitivity problem, the
size of the key space becomes much smaller than expected.
Therefore, a brute-force attack can be mounted to approxi-
mately guess the secret key, and the estimated key can be
used later to approximately decrypt the plaintext message
signals.
B. Parameter Estimation
For most analog chaos-based secure communication sys-
tems, the low sensitivity to the secret key is actually caused
by a very simple relationship between synchronization error
and key mismatch: the larger the key mismatch is, the larger
the synchronization error will be, and vice versa. This means
that an iterative algorithm can be used to determine the value
of the secret parameters, which corresponds to the concept of
“adaptive synchronization”. A lot of work has been reported
about adaptive synchronization when the master system’s
parameters are unknown to the receiver. Some of the work
can directly be used or easily extended to break analog chaos-
based secure communication systems [6]–[8].
Besides the method based on adaptive synchronization,
there are also other ways one can use to estimate the secret
parameters (i.e., the key) of the chaos-based cryptosystems.
For instance, due to the nature of Lorenz and Chua chaotic
systems, the secret parameters can be determined from the
driving signal and its derivative (mainly differentials of
different orders) [9]–[11]. For some specific schemes, it
is also possible to derive part of the secret parameters by
analyzing the return maps of the master systems [12].
When chosen-ciphertext attacks are possible, i.e., when
the attacker can access a legal receiver for some time, the
attacker can set the driving signal to a fixed constant C in
order to obtain the values of all secret parameters [13].
C. Estimating Carrier Signal
When the plaintext message signal m(t) is hidden in the
driving signal s(t) = x(t) + m(t), it may be possible to
recover the approximate dynamics of the master system and,
then, obtain an estimation of the carrier signal x(t), thus
leading to an approximate recovery of m(t). This idea works
for chaotic masking and some chaotic modulation systems.
The first report about this cryptanalytic method was
proposed by Short et al. in [14], by employing the NLD
(nonlinear dynamics) forecasting technique to estimate the
master system’s dynamics from the driving signal s(t) of
chaotic masking systems. Later he refined this technique and
extended it for chaotic modulation systems [15], [16]. The
NLD technique has been widely employed to break many
simple chaos-based secure communication systems.
D. Direct Extraction of Plaintext
For some chaos-based secure communication schemes, it
is also possible to directly estimate the plaintext message
signals from the driving signals without estimating the secret
key or the carrier signals. Many different methods have been
reported in recent years, mostly for chaotic masking and
chaotic switching schemes. In this subsection, we introduce
some of these specific methods.
1) Return-map Analysis: By constructing some return
maps of the master system, one may be able to estimate the
plaintext message signal from the fluctuation (for chaotic
masking) and the splitting (for chaotic switching) of the
return maps. This method was first proposed in [17] and
further developed in [12], [18] for other more advanced
systems.
2) Power-spectral (Filtering) Analysis: Though the dy-
namics of chaotic systems are rather complex, the power
spectra of their variables are not so complex as expected. As
investigated in [19], [20], even when the power spectra of
some chaotic systems seem to be good, significant spectrum
peaks can still be founded in the spectra by removing
the symmetries of the chaotic attractors. For instance, the
spectrum of x(t) in the Lorenz system is relatively good,
but that of |x(t)| has a significant peak. When the plaintext
message signal is hidden in the driving signal, the narrow-
band spectrum means that the driving signal can be directly
filtered to recover the message signal [21], [22].
3) Power Energy Analysis: For some parameter modula-
tion systems, the power energy of the driving signal varies
according to the value of the transmitted signal. This makes it
possible to obtain a smoothed version of the message signal
by observing the average power energy of the driving signal
in a sliding time-window [23]. Exact recovery of the plain
message signal is possible for chaotic switching systems,
because each bit has to be held for some time to ensure that
chaos synchronization is established.
4) Generalized Synchronization-based Method: For
chaotic switching systems and some parameter modulation
systems, there is a simple relationship between the
synchronization error and the value of the transmitted
signal. This fact can be exploited to extract the plaintext
message signal directly [22], [24].
5) Short-time Period analysis: When the spectrum of the
driving signal (or its derivative of some form) involved has
a significant peak (recall Section IV-D.2), generally there
exists a simple relationship between the peak frequency and
the values of the control parameters (see Fig. 9 in [20]).
In this case, one can try to extract the short-time period
as a measurement of the peak frequency modulated by the
plaintext message signal. According to the change of the
extracted short-time periods, the plaintext message signal
can be extracted exactly (for chaotic switching systems)
or approximately (for some parameter modulation systems)
[25], [26].
6) Switching-event Detection: For chaotic switching and
parameter modulation systems, the dynamics of the master
systems will change significantly when the value of the mod-
ulating signal (i.e., the plaintext message signal) changes.
By detecting and tracking these switching events, it may be
possible to recover the modulating signal [27].
V. NEW COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST KNOWN
ATTACKS
To overcome the security problems of most traditional
chaos-based secure communication schemes, a number of
new countermeasures have been proposed in recent years.
Among all the known attacks, the ones based on and the
NLD forecasting technique have received most attention,
while little work has done on the low sensitivity to the secret
key and the security problem of parameter estimation. This
section lists some of these new countermeasures and known
cryptanalytic results.
A. Using More Complex Chaotic Systems
One widely suggested measure is to use more complex
chaotic systems rather than three-dimensional systems like
the Lorenz and Chua systems. Hyperchaotic systems and
time-delay chaotic systems have been adopted for some
newly designed chaos-based secure communication systems.
Unfortunately, a number of recent cryptanalytic results have
shown that the introduction of hyperchaos or time-delay
chaos cannot essentially enhance security [7], [22], [28]–
[30].
B. Using More Complicated Synchronization Modes
Another widely suggested measure is to use more compli-
cated synchronization modes, such as impulsive, projective,
phase, or lag synchronization, and so on. Although definitive
results have not been obtained for the overall performance
of each new synchronization mode, some security prob-
lems have been reported for specific schemes [22], [31].
It seems that impulsive synchronization is most promising
as candidate base of designing new chaos-based secure
communication systems.
C. Additional Encryption Functions
In [32], Yang et al. suggested adding an additional encryp-
tion function (actually the n-fold composition of a piecewise
linear mapping) to chaos-based secure communication sys-
tems to enhance the security. This idea was later employed
by some other researchers. Although there is not too much
cryptanalytic work about this kind of combined chaos-based
secure communication systems, a recent result about NLD
[33] implies that the additional encryption function may be
circumvented.
D. Combining Heterogeneous Chaos-based Cryptosystems
By combining different types of chaos-based cryptosys-
tems, the security of the resulting system may be higher
than the security of each constituent. The simplest way
of combination is to cascade two or more heterogeneous
chaos-based cryptosystems together, e.g., a chaotic masking
subsystem plus a chaotic modulation subsystem as proposed
in [34], or a chaotic switching subsystem plus a chaotic
modulation subsystem as proposed in [35]. Unfortunately,
this simple combination has been proved to be insecure [7].
So, more complicated approaches of combination should be
further investigated.
E. Two-channel Approach
In [36], two separate channels were suggested to enhance
the security: one channel only for chaos synchronization and
the other one for complicated encryption of the plaintext
message signal. This scheme has been found insecure [37],
because parameter estimation is still possible by analyzing
the chaos synchronization channel.
F. Remodulating the Driving Signal
In [38] a countermeasure was proposed in form of remodu-
lating the driving signal before sending it to the receiver side.
This approach was soon broken [39]–[41], however, and one
improved version [40] has also proved to be insecure [12]
as well.
G. Modified Chaotic Switching Schemes
To enhance security against the return map attack, it is
possible to extend a chaotic switching system to include
2n > 2 chaotic systems [42], in which n systems correspond
to the plaintext bit 0 and the other n systems to the plaintext
bit 1. For each plaintext bit, the sender randomly chooses a
system from the n candidates and the receiver checks all 2n
chaotic systems to find out the correct one. In [42] another
measure is also adopted to further enhance the security, viz.,
to frequently change the driving signal from one variable to
another. A recent cryptanalytic report has shown that both
countermeasures are still not secure against the return map
attack [18].
In [43], pseudo-random false switching events are intro-
duced to enhance security against various known attacks. No
cryptanalytic result has been reported on this countermeasure
so far.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As most traditional chaos-based secure communication
systems and many new-generation ones have been known
to be insecure, novel ideas need to be created to improve
security. Combining more than two countermeasures may be
a promising way to get more secure cryptosystem. The low
sensitivity to the secret key and the potential possibility to
mount attacks based on parameter estimation are regarded
as the two greatest problems in almost all analog chaos-
based secure communication systems, thus deserving more
attention in future research.
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